Investment of Assets in Self-Directed Retirement Plans by Goodfellow, Gordon P. & Schieber, Sylvester J.
University of Pennsylvania 
ScholarlyCommons 
Wharton Pension Research Council Working 
Papers Wharton Pension Research Council 
1995 
Investment of Assets in Self-Directed Retirement Plans 
Gordon P. Goodfellow 
Sylvester J. Schieber 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Goodfellow, Gordon P. and Schieber, Sylvester J., "Investment of Assets in Self-Directed Retirement Plans" 
(1995). Wharton Pension Research Council Working Papers. 579. 
https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/579 
The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 1997 publication: Positioning Pensions for the 
21st Century. 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/579 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 
Investment of Assets in Self-Directed Retirement Plans 
Disciplines 
Economics 
Comments 
The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 1997 publication: Positioning Pensions 
for the 21st Century. 
This working paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/579 
Positioning Pensions
for the Twenty-First
Century
Edited by Michael S. Gordon,
Olivia S. Mitchell, and Marc M. Twinney
Published by
The Pension Research Council
The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania
and
University of Pennsylvania Press
Philadelphia
Cop>righl :6 19lJ7 The Pen"ion Re;>-.earch Council or Ih~Whanon School
of lhe llni\er~iryuf Pt'nn~;..l\'ania
All right... re5cryed
Pri.nted in Ihe.- CUlled Stale,; ol.\..mc.::rka on acid-free paper
1'1 9 H 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Puhlished b~'
Unin~l"$.ityOfPt'lll1.\d'·ania Pre<;~
Philadelphia. PenJl,,~h'ania1910+61)97
Llhral'\' orCollgres... Cata.login~-iJl-Pllblication D;lIa
96-5:l837
CIP
II. \1irchdl. Olhia S.
PO!,;ILioning PI~Il<;illllS for the n\'fmt~-firstCellt.llr. ,. ('dited b\ ~lichael S. Gordon. Olivia S.
~1ilchell and ~-1an:: ~t. T\dnne.-~.
p. em.
Inclurks bilJliogr.tphical rekrcllces and index.
ISRS 0-81 n-:\~91·3 (at·id·free paper)
1. Pellsinns-llniled States. I. Cordon. \Iirlmtl S.
Ill. T\\·innt~\·. :\Iarc \1.
HD7125.P67 1997
;t'\ I.:!.i ·2·()9i:Hic21
Chapter 5
Investment of Assets in Self-Directed
Retirement Plans
Gordon P. Goodfellow and
Sylvester j. Schieber
There is a growing concern among some retirement policy analysts
and employer-sponsors of retirement programs that the shift toward
participant-directed investment ofdefined contribution plan assets in re-
cent years is resulting in overly conservative investment of these assets.
The real concern is that we are not realizing the economic horsepower
from our defined contribution assets that we could realize and that, in
the long term, the retirement security of many workers participating
in self-directed plans will suffer accordingly. One recent survey sug-
gests that nearly two-thirds of plan sponsors are concerned about the
asset allocation decisions that their employees are making with their
employer-sponsored retirement plan assets (Institute of Management
and Administration 1995).
Recen tly there have been a number of articles in newspapers, general
news magazines, and trade publications raising the consciousness of the
general public about the concerns related to participant-directed invest-
ment of retirement plan assets. In some of the articles the focus is on
the relative capabilities of professional asset managers who are gen-
erally involved in the asset placement decisions of defined benefit assets
and those of individual plan participants in typical defined contribution
plans. In other cases the focus is on the relative risk that large sponsoring
organizations can assume in investing retirement assets in comparison to
individual investors. J
Despite the growing concerns about participant-directed investment
of retirement assets, there has been remarkably little research into the
actual investment decisions made by the participants in these plans. To
date, what limited research has been done mostly has focused on the
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comparative aggregate disu-ibution of retirement assets in defined bene-
fit and defined contribution plans. The conclusion from this research is
quite straightforward-DC plan participants tend to invest more of their
assets in fixed-income type assets and less in equities than do the inves-
tors of DB plan assets. By itself, this conclusion may be interesting but is
not necessarily informative.
The reason that the conclusions drawn from prior research on the
differences in the investment in DB and DC assets is not informative is
that it generally fails to account for the underlying variation in invest-
ment behavior that is behind the conclusion. Much of the prior research
also fails to consider the reasons for the variations between the invest-
ment styles of different types of plans and their legitimacy. In this chap-
ter we attempt to expand on the prior research. First, we investigate the
gradual shift from the organized management and investment of retire-
ment assets to the current environment where the investment of these
assets is increasingly being directed by the plan participants. Second, we
take a brief look at the differences in the aggregate investment of de-
fined benefit and defined contribution assets. Third, we analyze the in-
vestment of assets in a number of defined contribution plans across a
range of worker characteristics based on actual investment records from
a sample of defined contribution plans. In the final section of the
chapter, we draw some conclusions based on the earlier sections of the
chapter.
Background
Since the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) in 1974, we have seen defined contribution plans assume an
increasingly important role in the elements of the retirement security
system sponsored by employers. In 1975 there were slightly more than
103,000 private defined benefit plans in operation in the United States.
The number of defined benefit plans grew steadily until 19S3, when
there were just over 175,000 plans in operation. Since then we have seen
a fairly steady decline in the number of plans, with just under 102,000
plans in existence in 1991, the last year for which we have published
disclosure data. Over this same period the number of defined contri-
bution plans grew steadily from slightly under 20S,000 plans to nearly
600,000 plans (USDOL 1995:60).
The pattern of participation in defined benefit plans directly followed
the pattern of plan growth between 1975 and the eady 19S0s as partici-
pation grew from 33 million workers in the prior year to about 41 million
by 19S4. Although there was a decline of nearly 42 percent in the num-
ber of private defined benefit plans in operation between the early 1980s
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and 1990s, participation in the plans only declined by about 2.5 percent
from the peak and stood at 39 million workers in 1991. At the end of the
16-year period, participation was 18 percent higher in defined benefit
plans than it had been at the beginning. In the case of defined contri-
bution plans, the growth in participation was nearly as steady as the
growth in the number of plans. In 1975, there were 11.5 million partici-
pants in plans, growing to nearly 35 million by 1985. Beyond 1985, the
growth in defined contribution plan participants slowed somewhat. By
1991, participation in defined contribution plans had grown to 38.6 mil-
lion workers, representing a 335 percent growth over the level in 1975
but only a 10 percent growth over the level in 1985 (USDOL 1995).
Participation in defined contribution plans grew rapidly immediately
after the passage of ERISA because the benefit limits under section 415
of ERISA allowed greater tax-qualified retirement contributions in cases
where employers were sponsoring both types of plans than in cases
where they had only one or the other. This encouraged many employers
that had traditionally offered only a defined benefit plan to introduce
supplemental defined contribution programs. The growth in participa-
tion further accelerated during the early 1980s because of introduction
of section 401 (k) plans. Under these plans workers could voluntarily
defer compensation on a pre-tax basis. Most employers that had spon-
sored profit-sharing or thrift-savings plans prior to the publication of sec-
tion 401 (k) regulations introduced 401 (k) features into their defined
contribution plans. Many employers that had not offered such plans in
the past provided employees with a section 401 (k) plan soon after the
release of the regulations.
Through the end of the 1970s and into the early 1980s, the assets in
defined contribution plans typically were held in a pooled trust, and
each participant in the plan was credited with his or her vested pro rata
share of the pool. The vesting periods during this era could range up to
10 years, although they tended to be somewhat shorter than that. Be-
cause of the vesting periods, however, significant amounts of the money
in the plans at any point in time were not yet the property right of the
individuals to whom they had been credited. With the establishment
of 401 (k) plans, however, workers were now contributing their "own"
money to the plans to a much greater extent than they had before, and
there was immediate vesting in their balances. The new realities of de-
fined contribution plan structure changed perceptions about whose
money was in the plans and how that money should be managed. With
the evolution of 401 (k) plans during the 1980s, sponsors of defined con-
tribution plans increasingly offered participants the opportunity to di-
rect the investment of their retirement accounts.
ERISA generally provides that a fiduciary of a benefit plan must dis-
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charge his or her investment responsibilities prudently, including di-
versifYing plan investments to minimize the risk of large losses. To the
extent these duties are breached, the fiduciary is liable to the plan for
any losses. ERISA, however, includes an exception to this provision in
section 404(c) where it provides that in cases where the participants can
direct their own investments, the plan fiduciaries are not liable for any
loss or breach that results from the participant's exercise of control. In
the late summer of 1987, the Department of Labor released preliminary
regulations under section 404(c) beginning to detail the rules under
which employers could hand off some of the fiduciary obligations that
they held when they controlled their defined contribution assets.
The precipitous decline in stock prices during October 1987 raised a
number of fiduciary issues for plan sponsors still managing their defined
contribution plan portfolios. For example, many plans at that time cal-
culated the value of distributions on the basis of the last valuation date
of assets in the plan prior to a worker's termination. Many valuations
were done on a quarterly basis. Plans whose valuation dates coincided
with the end of a calendar quarter were in the position of paying individ-
uals who terminated prior to the end of 1987 considerably more than
the value of their respective accounts at the date of termination. Paying
someone terminating on October 31, 1987 the value of his or her ac-
count on the basis of a September 30, 1987 valuation would further
drain the value of the remaining portfolio for those workers who re-
mained in the plan. Thus, in addition to the restructuring of retirement
plans and the changing perception about ownership of plan assets, there
were practical developments that encouraged plan sponsors to allow par-
ticipants to direct their own investments.
During September 1992 the Department ofLabor finalized the section
404(c) regulations, which were somewhat less onerous than the initial
proposed regulations had been. In order for a plan to meet the 404(c)
requirements a plan must allow each participant to "exercise indepen-
dent control" over the assets in his or her individual account. This means
that the participant must be able to give investment instructions to a plan
fiduciary, who must generally comply with such instructions. In addition,
the regulations require that sufficient information to make informed in-
vestment decisions must be made available to participants in these plans.
The regulations allow plans to restrict the frequency with which invest-
ment changes may be made, but require that participants be able to give
investment instructions with a frequency which is appropriate for the
expected market volatility of the investment. The regulations state gen-
eral rules requiring that the available investment alternatives must be
sufficient to give the participant a reasonable opportunity to affect ma-
terially both the potential return on assets in his or her account and the
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degree of risk to which the assets are subject. The regulations require
that the participants be able to choose from at least three investment
alternatives, each of which is diversified (thus an employer's securities
cannot be one of the three), each of which has to have materially differ-
ent risk and return characteristics, which allow the participant to achieve
a diversified portfolio with desired risk and return characteristics, and so
minimize overall risk. In return for setting up the 404(c) plan, the spon-
sor is not liable to participants for any loss or breach of fiduciary respon-
sibility that may result from the participant's exercise of control.
The combination of factors that have evolved over the last 10 to
15 years means that most defined contribution plans today offer partici-
pants control over at least some part of their retirement accumulations.
As we have made the transition from professionally managed pension
portfolios to an increasing dependence on individual investment deci-
sions, the relative level of assets in defined contribution plans has been
increasing in comparison to defined benefit plans. In 1980, private de-
fined benefit plans held slightly more than US $400 billion in assets. The
balances had grown to US $1.1 trillion by 1991, reflecting an annual com-
pound growth rate of9.6 percent. By comparison, defined contribution
assets grew from US $162 billion in 1980 to US $834 billion in 1991, with
an underlying growth rate ofl6.1 percent per year (USDOL 1995: 70).2
Variations in the Investment of Retirement Plan Assets
A simple algebraic equation which captures the operations of both de-
fined benefit and defined contribution plans is
Benefits = Contributions + Asset Yield
The relative interest of plan sponsors in the specific variables in this
equation, however, are or should be vastly different between defined
benefit and defined contribution plans. In a defined benefit plan the
sponsor is responsible for delivering a set of benefits laid out in the bene-
fit formula that defines the essence of the plan. In this case there is a
direct inverse relationship between the yield on assets and the amount
of contributions or cost of the plan to the sponsor. In a defined contri-
bution plan the sponsor is responsible for delivering a set of contribu-
tions in accordance with the plan documents. In this case there is a direct
positive relationship between the yield on assets and the benefits deliv-
ered to the participant.
Historically, one of the motivations for setting up defined contribu-
tion plans instead of defined benefit plans is that the plan sponsor can
be freed of the investment risk faced when making the defined benefit
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promise. For example, one can argue that if private academic institu-
tions, which now largely depend on defined contribution plans, were to
shift to defined benefit plans they would face the prospect of required
increases in retirement plan funding during down cycles in the invest-
ment markets which would coincide with the deterioration of the value
of their endowments, which are generally invested in financial assets and
on which they are dependent for operating income. In other words, if
private academic institutions that rely heavily on endowment income
were to shift to defined benefit plans, they would be hit with their heavi-
est benefit funding requirements at exactly the times they were least able
to meet them. Thus, because of this timing problem, defined contribu-
tion plans may best meet the needs of private universities from the per-
spective of their larger financing considerations and the financial risk
they face over the investment cycle.'
Employers' movement to 404(c) plans allowing the plan participants
to direct the investment of their own accounts is a further effort to pass
on the risk of negative market performance to the plan participants. The
404(c) regulations are quite specific: if the plan sponsor offers a diversi-
fied set of investment options, the participants are given tlle opportunity
to move money among investment options with some frequency and are
provided information on the investment options. The participants, not
the plan sponsors, are at risk from negative investment outcomes. Pre-
sumably, sponsors of retirement programs have been aware that they are
passing risk to the participants in their retirement programs as they have
moved away from defined benefit plans and into 404(c) defined contri-
bution plans.
Once risk is passed from the sponsor of a retirement program to the
participants in tile program, it should not be surprising that the risk that
is assumed in the investment of the plan assets changes. One of the rea-
sons that individuals have different investment preferences than plan
sponsors relates to their respective time horizons. Especially for older
workers, the time horizon over which they are considering the invest-
ment of tlleir retirement assets may be extremely short. For a plan spon-
sor which is an ongoing entity, on the other hand, the time horizon
might be almost infinite. The implications of the time horizon can be
seen by considering the case of a worker who has US $100,000 to invest
with the choice of investing it in a riskless asset with an annual rate of
return of 3 percent or in a S& P 500 index fund with an expected return
of 10 percent with a 15 percent standard deviation (Kritzman 1994).
Table 1 shows the range of possible outcomes that the investor faces.
After one year the value ofthe fixed-income asset is US $103,000. The
risky asset's value, on the other hand, will be between US $81,980 and
US $147,596 95 percent of the time. There certainly is some upside po-
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TABLE 1 Terminal Wealth from a Risky Versus Riskless Investment
S & P 500 95 % Confidence Interval
I,ower Boundary Upper Boundary
Fixed-Income
Asset
Terminal Wealth
1 Vear
5 Years
10 Vears
15 Years
20 years
Source: Kri tman (1994: 15) .
$ 81,980
83,456
102,367
133,776
180,651
$ 147,596
310,792
657,196
1,304,376
2,565,345
$103,000
115,927
134,392
155,797
180,611
tential from investing in the risky asset, but there is also considerable
downside risk. By comparison, after 20 years, the low-risk asset's value
accumulates to US $180,611 while the 95 percent confidence interval
range of values for the risky asset is from US $180,651 to US $2,565,345.
This example seems to suggest that, over a longer time horizon, an in-
vestor's aversion to risk should be ameliorated.
Nevertheless Kritzman (1994) argues that some investors who prefer a
low-risk asset to a risky one over a three-month time horizon would also
prefer a riskless asset over a ten- or twenty-year horizon if three condi-
tions are met: first, the investor's risk aversion is invariant to changes in
wealth; second, the investor believes that risky returns are random; and
third, the investor's future wealth depends only on investment income.
The underlying logic in Kritzman's analysis is that risk aversion implies
the standard economic model of declining marginal utility related to in-
creases in wealth. Specifically, an investor is assumed to realize a greater
increase in satisfaction as wealth increases from US $100,000 to US
$150,000 than from a similar increase from US $150,000 to US $200,000.
The problem with risky investments for some investors is that the slope
of their utility curves is such that the potential disutility from losing even
a small amount of value in their assets outweighs the added potential
utility from substantially larger gains. While Table 1 suggests that a
longer time horizon would make the more risky investment option the
desirable one for our hypothetical investor, the table does not show the
99 percent confidence interval values of the risky investment outcomes.
For some investors, the potential disutility of a loss in wealth is so large
that, even considering its extremely small probability of occurring, it still
is not worth the relatively smaller increases in satisfaction from large po-
tential gains at a much higher probability of occurrence.
One of the conditions specified in the Kritzman analysis is that the
investor must believe that risky returns are random. A recent Oppen-
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heimer-Money Magazine poll indicated that nearly one-half of respond-
ents believe that people who invest in the stock market get wiped out at
least once during their investment careers (Oppenheimer Funds 1994).
The conclusion that stock investors get wiped out periodically suggests
that people believe the returns in the market are random, otherwise they
would think investors would be able to anticipate downturns and get out
of the market before being wiped out. On the other hand, most manag-
ers of pension assets believe that investing in a diversified equity portfo-
lio pays a risk "premium" to the investor. Indeed, some prognosticators
believe that all pension assets managed on a pooled basis might be fully
invested in equities if it were not for liquidity needs to manage plan op-
erations over the short term, and because offunding considerations over
variations in the investment cycle-that is, the plan sponsor wants to
avoid being thrown into an underfunding situation by a decline in equity
values in the portfolio during the down portion of the investment cycle
(Markland 1994).
Information on exactly where different types of investors put their re-
tirement money varies somewhat from study to study. An Employee
Benefit Research Institute analysis of 1989 Form 5500 filings suggested
that defined benefit plans compared to 401(k) plans held nearly two-
thirds more of their investment portfolio in stocks (Wyatt Company
1994). Greenwich Associates has estimated that participants in 401 (k)
plans invest only 39 percent of their assets in equities and the remainder
in fixed-income investment options. They estimate that defined benefit
plans, on the other hand, have just exactly the opposite mix of equities
and fixed-income assets (Smith 1993).
Where Plan Participants Put Their Retirement Money
Today there is a growing sense that we need to change the investment
allocation of the assets that are accumulating in defined contribution
plans or, more specifically, 401 (k) plans. The news media frequently
runs stories about the need to invest retirement assets more wisely. There
is a growing public policy awareness that there is a potential problem
here, and we are even beginning to see calls for employers to take back
the responsibility of investing and managing the assets in 401 (k) plans
(Rohrer 1994). In light of this, some employers have begun undertaking
major education programs to change the investment behavior of plan
participants. Yet remarkably little is known about how individual inves-
tors allocate their retirement resources and what we must do if we want
to encourage alternative behavior.
In order to help explain the investment behavior of participants in
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self-directed retirement plans, we have pooled administrative records on
slightly more than 36,000 participants drawn from 24 defined contribu-
tion plans holding nearly US $1.4 billion in total assets. The total number
of participants in these plans ranged from around 150 to 6,000. We had
some larger plan data that we chose not to include here because there
were strong financial incentives encouraging investment in company
stock which resulted in disproportionately heavy investment in that asset
option. Table 2 shows a distribution of the total assets in the plans that
are included in this analysis. We did not include approximately US
$50 million in rollover money in these plans because such accounts were
reported in only about 5 percent of the cases and because some plans
may have more restrictive investment options for such money compared
to money accumulated under their own programs.
Table 2 shows both the distribution of participants investing in various
asset types and the total assets invested in each asset class. The fixed-
income funds include bond, GIC, and money market funds and would
generally be the classes of assets which have raised the concerns about
where self-directed retirement money is being invested. The balanced
fund class of investments are funds that hold a mixed portfolio of stocks
and bonds. Company stock is the stock of the sponsor of the plan in
which the individual participates. The domestic equity funds invest in a
portfolio of stocks of companies issuing such stocks in the United States.
The international equity funds invest in stocks of companies outside the
United States.
The distribution of assets in the table suggests that between 35 and
40 percent of the total assets being analyzed here are in equity funds,
which is comparable to other estimates of the aggregate allocation of
self-directed retirement assets. Interestingly, consistently a larger share
of the participants invest in each of the equity funds than the share of
assets that are allocated to each of them. One of the things that is clear
from Table 2 is that substantial numbers of investors are investing at least
some of their assets in equity funds.
Self-Directed Investment of Retirement Assets and Age of
Participants
The earlier discussion suggested that, for at least some participants in
plans, the time horizon over which they are investing might be important
in determining their investment allocations. While a longer time horizon
might be insufficient to encourage some investors with a strong aversion
to risk to move any of their assets into equities, for some, the prospect
of moderate risk of loss over a longer time frame and the possibility of
TAIlLE ~ Assets Held in Defined Contribution Accounts by Type of Investment
Average Asset
Participants Percent with Balance of
with This This Asset Total Assets Perunt of Asset Holders
Type ofAsset Asset Type Type (US $) Total Assets (US $)
Fixed-Income Funds 24,825 68.9% $ 799,457,499 58.1% $32,204
Balanced Funds 7,647 21.2 107,432,387 7.8 14,049
Company Stock Funds 6,827 19.0 83,307,341 6. ] 12,203
Domestic Equity Funds 24,801 68.9 348,221,176 2.~.3 14,041
]nternational Equity Funds 3,730 10.4 38,464,729 2.8 10,312
-- ---
Total 36,244 $1,376,883,132 ]00.0% $38,234
Source: Authors' calculations.
TAIlU: 3 Percent of DC Participants Invested in Specific Types of Investmel1l by Participant Age
Age of Plan Pm·ticipant
T1'/Je of Investment Under 21 21to 30 31 to 40 41 to 50 51 to 60 61+
Fixed-Income Funds 65.1% 63.8% 67.3% 69.9% 73.8% 81.8%
Balanced Funds 27.4 21.4 22.8 20.8 19.9 21.2
Company Stock Funds 13.2 17.9 19.4 18.6 20.4 ]9.0
Domestic Equity Funds 59.4 70.8 73.0 695 61.2 68.9
International Equity Funds 0.0 8.6 11.2 11.2 9.8 10.4
Source: Authors' calculations.
Gordon P. Goodfellow and Sylvester J. Schieber 77
substantial gain from a more aggressive investment posture suggest that
young people would likely put more of their money into riskier assets
than older workers.
Table 3 shows the percentage of workers by their ages who invest in
each of the money classes being considered. The patterns there are
consistent with what is expected. At each succeeding age in the table,
increasing percentages of plan participants put money into the fixed-
income option from youngest to oldest participants. We also see lower
utilization of the various equity funds at older ages.
The allocation of assets in the plans by the age of participants is even
more pronounced than the distribution of individual investors in each
of the asset classes. Table 4 shows the relative allocation of assets into
each of the fund options by the age of the participants. At the younger
ages, under 40, the allocation of assets is probably fairly close to the
60 percent equity, 40 percent fixed-income combination that some ana-
lysts think is relevant for retirement assets. At the older ages, though,
there is a marked shift away from the riskier asset options which many
retirement planners would advocate. Within the context of the age dis-
tribution shown here, the investment of assets does not appear as unso-
phisticated as the aggregate data suggest.
\'-'hile Table 4 suggests that the investment behavior of individuals is
more reasonable than we often conclude by looking at the aggregate
results, it also holds at least part of the key for explaining why the aggre-
gate distribution of self-directed investment behavior looks so conserva-
tive. Table 5 holds the remaining part of the explanation. Table 5 shows
the average balances of the participants holding various kinds of assets
by the age of the participants. It is not too surprising that the balances at
the older ages are significantly higher than they are at younger ages. The
higher balances among the older participants in combination with their
natural inclinations to invest more conservatively result in the overall
conservative nature of the investment of self-directed accounts.
The data presented thus far suggest that there is considerable diversi-
fication in the selection of assets from the options available to plan par-
ticipants. Another way to look more specifically at the diversification in
the portfolios is to consider the concentration of investments in indi-
vidual investment options. Table 6 shows the investment concentration
for three elements of the investment portfolios offered to the plan par-
ticipants: fixed-income, domestic equity, and international equity funds.
The second column in the table shows the number of potential investors
in each of the funds by the participant's age. The number of potential
investors can vary from fund type to fund type because not every fund
type is offered by each plan sponsor, although all offer fixed-income and
domestic equity funds. The next column in the table shows the percent
TABLE 4 Percent of DC Assets Invested in Specific Types of Investment by Participant Age
Age ofPlan Participant
Type of TnveJtment Under 21 21 to 30 31 to 40 41 to 50 51 to 60 61+
Fixed-Income Funds 52.6% 41.4% 43.4% 49.4% 61.5% 85.2%
Balanced Funds 8.4 5.7 8.2 11.0 8.3 1.3
Company Stock Funds 4.2 11.0 8.9 6.1 5.8 2.7
Domestic Equity Funds 34.8 39.1 36.4 29.7 22.0 9.5
International Equity Funds - 2.8 3.1 3.8 2.5 1.2
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: Some columns may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding error.
TABLE 5 Average DC Investment Balance (US $) in Speciftc Types oflnvestment for Those Holding the Investment by Participant Age
Age ofPlan Participant
Type ofInvestment Under 21 21 to 30 31 to 40 41to 50 51 to 60 61+
Fixed-Income Funds $400 $3,786 $12,974 $29,265 $65,131 $187,542
Balanced Funds 152 1,553 7,217 21,938 32,443 17,761
Company Stock Funds 156 3,584 9,238 13,517 22,068 29,246
Domestic Equity Funds 290 3,223 10,064 17,684 28,043 35,995
International Equity Funds - 1,881 5,608 13,968 20,123 31,627
Total $494 $5,836 $20,150 $41,387 $78,133 $179,955
Source: Authors' calculations.
TABLE 6 Concentration of DC Assets in Selected Investment Options by Participant Age
Percent ofPotential Investors with x Percent of Total Assets in This Investment
No. Potential 0.01 to 20.1 to 40.1 to 60.1 to 80.1 to
Age of Worker.s Investors Zero 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0
Fixed-Income Funds
Under 21 106 34.9% 6.6% 8.5% 10.4% 5.7% 34.0%
21 LO 30 6,267 36.7 9.4 12.5 12.3 6.3 22.9
31LO 40 12,836 33.7 10.4 13.1 12.2 7.0 23.6
41LO 50 10,001 30.8 9.2 13.0 12.2 7.1 27.8
51 to 60 5,464 26.7 7.4 11.0 12.2 7.5 35.2
61 or over 1.338 18.7 5.7 8.1 9.6 9.4 48.5
Domestic Equity Funds
Under 21 106 40.6% 6.6% 10.4% 15.1 % 7.5% 19.8%
21 to 30 6.267 29.2 7.3 10.9 15.9 12.2 24.5
31 to 40 12,836 27.1 9.7 12.7 16.7 12.3 21.6
41 to 50 10,001 30.6 9.5 12.2 16.9 11.2 19.5
51 to 60 5,464 38.9 11.3 12.0 13.7 8.7 15.5
6J or over 1,338 52.3 9.6 9.0 10.2 5.2 J3.6
International Equity Funds
Under 21 14 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
21 to 30 2.277 76.3 11.3 7.7 2.5 0.9 1.3
31 to 40 5,742 74.9 J1.9 8.1 3.0 1.0 J.l
41 to 50 4,533 75.3 J2.0 7.4 3.2 0.8 1.3
51 to 60 2,487 75.8 11.5 5.7 2.3 0.6 1.3
61 or over 807 88.5 5.9 2.9 1.6 0.2 0.9
Saurce: Authors' calculations.
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of the potential investors who have zero percent of their portfolio in-
vested in the particular fund type. The right hand column of the table
shows the percent of potential investors who have more than 80 percent
of their total plan assets in the designated fund type. The table suggests
that, even at the youngest ages, there are substantial numbers of par-
ticipants who are investing their assets quite conservatively. The fixed-
income funds seem to be particularly attractive to significant numbers of
investors for most or all of their retirement assets. This would not be an
investment strategy that most financial counselors would recommend
for many of the plan participants who are investing their assets in this
fashion.
Table 7 shows the concentration of investment in the company stock
and balanced fund investment classes. Company stock is relatively popu-
lar with many of the participant~who have an option to purchase it. The
problem with buying company stock for the retirement portfolio is that
it accentuates the risk that the worker already faces from the possibility
of reduced lifetime income if the employer sponsoring the plan should
have economic problems. It was this concern that led policymakers to
limit the amount of a plan sponsor's stock that can be held in the asset
portfolio of a defined benefit plan. While many plan participants un-
doubtedly feel secure and will do well in investing in a company where
they work and in which they trust, this again is not an investment option
in which most financial counselors would advise workers to invest signifi-
cant amounts of their retirement assets.
The balanced fund option might be thought of as a "lazy" investor's
way naturally to diversifY the retirement portfolio between equities and
bonds without having to do any of the asset allocation personally. Despite
being an easy way to diversifY risk, these investment funds do not attract
the high concentration of investment that fixed-income and the com-
pany stock funds attract. There certainly seem to be some opportunities
here for improving the allocation of retirement funds directed by plan
participants.
Self-Directed Investment of Retirement Assets and Wage Level of
Participants
Another way to consider the variations in the self-<!irected investment of
defined contribution assets is to look at how investment behavior varies
across different wage levels of workers. Table 8 shows the percent of par-
ticipants investing in various classes of assets in comparison to their an-
nual wage levels. Here again, there are some very cleat' differences in the
investment behavior of workers at different wage levels. Other than at
the very lowest wage level, there is a clear declining pattern of investment
TABLE 7 Concentration of DC Assets in Company Stock and Balanced Funds by Age of Plan Participants
Percent ojPotential Investors with x Percent oj Total Assets in "l'llis Investment
No. Potential 0.01 to 20.1 to 40.1 to 60.1 to 80.1 to
Age ojW01f,ers Investors Zero 20.0 40.0 60.0 flO. 0 100.0
Company Stock
Under 21 16 125% 6.3% 25.0% 18.8% 6.3% 31.3%
21 to 30 1,799 37.8 13.5 18.9 12.5 4.7 12.6
31 to 40 3,928 36.5 16.9 19.7 11.4 6.1 9.4
41 to 50 3,164 41.2 15.9 19.7 9.9 5.0 8.2
51 to 60 2,198 49.4 12.9 15.2 8.1 5.6 8.8
61 or over 447 50.3 14.5 18.1 7.4 4.7 4.9
Balanced Fund
Under 21 83 65.1% 13.3% 8.4% 9.6% 2.4% 1.2%
21 to 30 4,284 68.7 11.1 10.2 6.1 1.6 2.4
31 to 40 9,102 68.0 11.3 11.2 6.6 1.2 1.7
41 to 50 6,813 69.5 10.7 10.7 6.3 J.J 1.7
51 to 60 4,120 73.6 9.8 9.1 5.3 0.9 1.2
61 or over 1,046 82.9 6.5 5.7 3.2 0.7 1.1
Source: Authors' calculations.
TABLE 8 Percent of DC Participants Invested in Specific Types of Investment by Participant Earnings (US $)
Participant A nnnal Earnings
I.ess than $15,00010 $25,00010 $35,000 to $45,00010 $60,00010 $75,000 to $100,000
Type ojInvestment $15,000 $24,999 $34,999 $44,999 $59,999 $74,999 $99,999 or More
Fixed-Income Funds 63.5% 74.7% 72.4% 67.3% 61.5% 58.3% 56.0% 63.9%
Balanced Funds 31.8 19.6 19.7 22.4 21.3 19.8 17.9 18.1
Company Stock Funds 16.0 17.3 21.5 24.0 27.6 28.0 22.4 5.9
Domestic Equity Funds 68.5 59.0 65.7 74.5 81.5 84.2 86.7 86.4
International Equity 3.0 6.8 7.9 11.0 15.5 19.8 25.7 26.3
Source: Authors' calculations.
TABLE 9 Percent of DC Assets Invested in Specific Types of Investment by Participant Earnings (US $)
Pa.rticipant Annnal Eamings
Less than $15,00010 $25,00010 $35,00010 $45,00010 $60,000 to $75,00010 $/00,000
Type ojInvestmenl $15,000 $24,999 $34,999 $44,999 $59,999 $74,999 $99,999 or More
Fixed-Income Funds 62.1% 63.0% 61.6% 66.7% 53.2% 32.2% 26.0% 27.2%
Balanced Funds 5.9 7.2 9.0 6.5 12.0 11.1 14.7 8.4
Company Stock Funds 6.5 7.6 8.2 6.6 7.6 10.6 7.9 2.3
Domestic Equity Funds 24.6 21.5 19.5 18.6 25.3 42.2 45-.4 52.0
International Equity 0.6 0.8 1.7 1.6 2.0 3.9 6.1 10.2
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: Some columns may nol sum to 100 percent due to rounding error.
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in fixed-income funds. At the higher wage levels there is generally a
greater prevalence of investment in the equity funds. The other fund
category is particularly popular at the upper wage levels.
Table 9 shows the distribution of assets in the various asset classes by
the wage levels of the participants. While we noted above that the per-
cent of participants investing in fixed-income funds declined at higher
wage levels, we see an ever greater drop-off in the concentration of as-
sets in these funds among higher-wage workers, especially at wage levels
above US $60,000 per year. Higher-wage workers appear to be pursuing
higher rates of return and invest a greater percentage of their assets in
equity funds than their lower-wage counterparts.
In the earlier discussion about aversion to risk, three conditions were
posited as necessary for the short-term risk aversion carrying over into
the longer term. One of these was that an investor's risk aversion was
invariant to changes in wealth. Another was that future wealth depends
only on investment results. The more aggressive investment pattern of
the higher-wage workers suggests that these conditions may not apply
evenly across the wage spectrum. Part of the reason might be because of
the higher relative utility of accumulated wealth on the part of lower-
wage workers than for those with higher wages.
Table 10 shows the average balances in each of the investment classes
for the individuals with assets in the class. Interestingly, in each of the
wage categories up to US $60,000 per year or more, the average fixed-
income fund balance for the investors with some fixed-income holdings
significantly exceeds the average balances in the other investment cate-
gories. In other words, at lower wage levels those with the most money
tend to invest in fixed-income options. Another interesting aspect of
Table 10 is that in the pay ranges up to US $35,000 per year, the partici-
pants in the plans appear to have accumulated an average balance that
is roughly equivalent to a year's pay. Between US $35,000 and US $60,000
per year, they appear to have accumulated somewhat more than a year's
pay on average. Above US $60,000 per year the average accumulation is
significantly less than one year's pay.
Earlier we looked at the concentration of investment in certain of the
investment funds on the basis of the age of the participants. Table 11
shows the concentration of investment by the wage level of the partici-
pants in the plans for fixed-income funds, company stock, and the bal-
anced fund investment options. In each case there tends to be a much
greater concentration of investment in the specific funds at lower-wage
levels than at higher ones. For example, within the wage band of
US $15,000 to US $24,999, 37.5 percent of the participants eligible to
invest in fixed-income funds put more than 80 percent of their total
TABLE 10 Average DC Assets Investment Balance in Specific Types of Investment Classes for Those Holding the Investment by Participant
Earnings (US $)
Participant Annual Eamings
Less than $15,000 to $25,000 to $35,000 to $45,000 to $60,000 to $75,000 to $100, 000
Type ojInvestment $15,000 $24,999 $34,999 $44,999 $59,999 $74,999 $99,999 or More
Fixed-Income Funds $13,827 $13,173 $24,002 $52,605 $54,681 $28,608 $32,314 $31,943
Balanced Funds 2,615 5,753 12,901 15,382 35,517 28,890 57,133 35,023
Company Stock Funds 5,723 6,864 10,767 14,528 17,346 19,624 24,681 28,887
Domestic Equity Funds 5,082 5,685 8,394 13,281 19,592 25,952 36,472 45,158
International Equity 4,402 1,741 5,883 7,957 8,357 10,138 16,483 29,103
Total 14,147 15,624 28,220 53,105 63,252 51,738 69,673 75,104
Source: AUlhors' calculations.
TABLE 11 Concentration of DC Individual Asset Holdings in Selected Investment Funds by Participant Earnings (US $)
Percent ofPotential Investors with x Percent of Total Assets in This Investment
Participant No. Potential 0.01 to 20.1 to 40.1 to 60.1 to 80.1 to
A nnual Earnings Investors Zero 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0
Fixed-Income Funds
Under $15,000 6,720 36.6% 7.0% 13.2% 14.2% 5.9% 23.2%
$15,000 to 24,999 8,827 25.6 7.4 11.2 11.2 7.1 37.5
$25,000 to 34,999 6,700 28.0 9.7 12.7 11.2 7.3 3Ll
$35,000 to 44,999 3,820 33.2 10.4 13.2 13.4 7.9 21.9
$45,000 to 59,999 2,811 39.5 11.7 12.0 ILl 8.1 17.6
$60,000 to 74,999 1,433 43.6 13.1 14.2 9.4 6.4 13.3
$75,000 to 99,999 1,163 47.0 12.2 13.0 10.6 5.8 11.4
$100,000 or more 2,152 39.7 14.6 13.8 11.6 6.9 13.4
Company Stock
Under $15,000 2,008 46.5% 9.0% 17.6% 10.4% 3.2% 13.3%
$15,000 to 24,999 2,777 45.0 13.2 17.0 9.7 5.4 9.7
$25,000 to 34,999 2,231 35.4 16.0 19.5 12.1 6.9 10.1
$35,000 to 44,999 1,436 36.3 16.9 18.5 11.7 6.8 10.0
$45,000 to 59,999 1,203 35.6 21.6 19.5 10.1 6.2 7.0
$60,000 to 74,999 660 39.2 22.9 18.6 9.8 4.7 4.7
$75,000 to 99,999 422 38.4 21.6 24.9 7.6 4.5 3.1
$100,000 or more 225 44.0 16.9 28.4 5.3 2.7 2.7
Balanced Fund
Under $15,000 4,901 56.4% 11.5% 16.7% 10.5% 2.0% 2.9%
$15,000 to 24,999 6,208 72.2 10.4 8.8 5.7 1.0 1.7
$25,000 to 34,999 4,592 71.2 10.8 9.7 5.2 1.5 1.6
$35,000 to 44,999 2,795 69.5 11.7 10.2 6.2 0.9 1.6
$45,000 to 59,999 2,116 71.7 12.3 8.5 5.3 0.8 1.4
$60,000 to 74,999 1,152 75.3 10.8 7.5 4.3 Ll 1.0
$75,000 to 99,999 954 78.4 8.8 7.7 3.9 0.6 0.6
$100,000 or more 225 79.3 9.4 8.4 2.0 0.2 0.6
Source: Authors' calculations.
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retirement plan assets in those types offunds. By comparison, only about
10 to 15 percent of workers at higher wage levels do so.
Participants are much less likely to bet most or all of their retirement
assets on the stock of the companies for which they work than they are
to put it mostly in fixed-income options. Where company stock is avail-
able as an investment option, workers at the lowest wage levels are three
to five times as likely to have 80 percent or more of their retirement plan
savings in company stock than at the highest wage levels. It is somewhat
ironic that the workers who generally have the least potential to control
the operations of the employers for which they work are the most willing
to fully commit their long-term retirement security to the successful per-
formance of those organizations.
The concentration of assets in the balanced fund class of investments
is interesting because of the relative lack of use of the accounts across
the wage spectrum. At the bottom of the wage distribution, only about
45 percent of plan participants with a balanced fund option put any
money into the funds. In the middle of the wage distribution, generally
less than 30 percent use these fund options, and at the top of the wage
distribution it falls to only about 20 percent. For those using these op-
tions, most are putting less than half their retirement assets in them.
Never as many as 5 percent of those who have an option to use a bal-
anced fund put more than 60 percent of their savings into these ac-
counts. At the highest wage levels, not even 1 percent of the participants
put more than 60 percent of their assets into them. Much of the recent
commotion about repackaging balanced funds under the rubric of "life
stages" funds may result in their greater utilization, but the data here
suggest that they do not attract many retirement savers faced with a num-
ber of alternative investment options.
Self-Directed Investment of Retirement Assets and Plan Sponsor
Thus far we have focused on variations in investment patterns of partici-
pants in retirement savings plans on the basis of the age and wage levels
of the participants. A completely different way to look at variations in
participants' investment patterns is to consider how these patterns vary
across the plans included in the analysis. For this segment of the analy-
sis we are only looking at the concentration of assets invested in fixed-
income funds. While this may provide a somewhat incomplete picture, it
is instructive because it suggests that plan sponsors can affect the invest-
ment behavior of the participants in their plans.
Table 12 shows the percentage of investors with varying concentrations
of their total retirement plan assets in the various fixed-income funds.
The variation in the distributions is quite remarkable. The percentage of
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TABLE 12 Concentration of DC Individual Asset Holdings in Fixed-Income
Funds by Plan Sponsor
Percent ojPotential Investors with x Percent oj Total Assets in This Investment
Plan 20.0 ar 20.1 to 40.1 to 60.1 to 80.1 to
Sponsor Zero Less 40.0 60.0 80.0 100
A 22.0% 8.0% 10.5% 15.4% 8.5% 35.7%
B 23.4 11.3 12.2 11.9 13.0 28.2
C 25.7 6.3 9.4 10.5 8.6 39.4
D 35.3 12.5 14.7 15.0 6.5 16.0
E 28.4 13.4 21.8 23.8 5.4 7.2
F 5.8 0.7 3.6 5.1 0.0 84.7
G 30.5 11.4 14.9 11.7 6.7 24.8
H 29.0 4.2 8.1 15.1 6.8 36.8
I 69.5 8.0 U.8 3.2 1.6 5.9
J 11.4 7.2 15.4 15.7 17.9 32.4 .
K 28.6 11.9 27.6 17.2 5.3 9.3
M 19.1 3.8 12.6 21.4 15.1 28.1
32.8 5.2 7.8 2.2 0.0 51.9
0 0.6 0.3 0.0 1.6 0.8 96.8
P 5.4 2.3 3.4 4.0 1.9 83.0
Q 42.4 4.7 13.2 15.2 6.7 17.8
R 49.2 6.0 15.8 14.4 3.1 U.5
S 30.7 5.5 14.8 17.5 8.4 23.2
T 35.9 12.3 16.3 11.5 6.9 17.2
U 49.2 7.3 15.2 12.8 3.6 11.9
V 44.5 19.3 13.1 7.3 4.8 ILl
W 8.8 2.4 2.3 5.9 3.7 76.9
X 45.4 18.4 11.5 9.8 2.9 11.9
Y 43.8 10.0 12.5 11.5 8.9 13.4
Source: Authors' calculations.
participants who have no fixed-income investments in their plans range
from a low of0.6 percent to a high of 49.2 percent. The percentage hold-
ing 80 to 100 percent of their assets in fixed-income funds ranges from
7.2 percent to 96.8 percent. In the latter case, the plan sponsor also of-
fers the participants a domestic equity fund, an international equity
fund, and a balanced fund. The participants in plans 0 and P are rela-
tively old, which may account for the heavy concentration of investment
in fixed-income funds. Plan W has only recently offered participants in-
vestment options other than a GIe, and it may simply take some time for
participants to become familiar with their other opportunities to invest.
Even taking these explanations for high concentration of assets in some
of the fixed-income funds into account, the variations in the table sug-
gest that there is something about the plans being offered by the spon-
sors, or in how they are being communicated, that is having a very
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significant effect on the investment behavior of the participants. At this
stage of the analysis we have not yet begun to understand more fully what
may be causing the variations that we have found. That will be an issue
to be pursued in further research.
Conclusions
The research presented here is merely a beginning assessment of the
factors behind the investment behavior of retirement plan participants
who manage the allocation of their own retirement plan assets. As the
immediately preceding section suggests, there is a great deal of addi-
tional work to be done. Still there are several conclusions that we can
draw from the current effort. First, we find a pattern of investments that
suggests younger workers are generally more aggressive in their invest-
ment behavior than older workers. There are some clear exceptions to
this general pattern, however, as even some of the youngest workers are
totally invested in fixed-income investmen t options. Second, we find that
higher-wage workers are somewhat more aggressive in their investment
behavior than lower-wage workers. Again, there are clear exceptions to
this conclusion. Some high-wage workers are very conservatively invest-
ing their retirement assets. Among lower-wage workers with an option to
invest in the stock of their employers, we find that there is some substan-
tial number who are investing virtually all of their retirement money
there which is probably inappropriate, or even undesirable, in a diver-
sification sense. We believe that better education programs may lead
to somewhat different investment patterns than we now find in self-
directed defined contribution plans. We do not believe, however, that
any amount of education would result in self-directed defined contribu-
tion assets being invested in accordance with the investment style that
prevails among defined benefit plans.
Putting these results into the framework of the larger discussion about
self-directed retirement investment issues leads back to consideration of
the motivations that employers have in setting up and administering
their retirement savings programs. Traditionally, employers have
thought about retirement programs as target savings vehicles that have
certain human resource incentives built into them. In the context of the
replacement rate model often utilized in designing or analyzing retire-
ment programs, plans are designed so participants can accumulate re-
tirement assets during their working careers sufficient to generate
income during their retirement that allows them to maintain their pre-
retirement disposable income levels.
More specifically, within the context of sponsoring a defined benefit
plan, the replacement rate model has often been used to design plans
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which deliver benefits in conjunction with Social Security and personal
savings that allow retirees to maintain pre-retirement living standards.
Once the defined benefit plan is specified, the sponsor is on the hook
for delivering the benefits as stipulated. In this environment the plan
sponsol- is interested in pursuing investment policies which minimize
contributions to the plan over time, or at least coordinate contributions
with business operations, and over time periods that exceed the earning
or accumulation periods of individual employees.
Within the context of sponsoring a defined contribution plan, spon-
sors are pushing investment risk onto plan participants. But for a variety
of reasons discussed above, workers may have completely different risk
preferences than their employers in investing retirement assets. It should
not be a surprise to anyone that risk preferences or tolerances vary across
individuals and for workers in comparison to their employers. Returning
to the replacement rate model used in designing retirement programs,
if self-directed defined contribution plans tend to generate lower rates
of return, as we believe they generally will on average, then the overall
saving in the defined contribution plans will have to be greater in order
to generate the same replacement of pre-retirement income than if a
defined benefit plan was being used. If employers' motivation in setting
up retirement plans is to deliver a targeted level of retirement income at
a minimum contribution cost, then self-directed defined contribution
plans are not the optimal way to achieve their goal. If employers' moti-
vations in setting up their defined contribution plans is to hand off in-
vestment risk, minimize the liability for bad investment outcomes, and
give workers some flexibility in meeting their own retirement income
needs, then self-directed defined contribution plans are probably the op-
timal way to achieve that goal. No matter which goal is pursued, there is
a price to be paid in each case.
The authors' comments and opmlOns expressed in this paper are
solely their own and do not necessarily represent the opirlions of Watson
Wyatt Worldwide or any of its associates.
Notes
1. The headlines and tone of the articles has become alarmist in some cases-
such as a recent Panel Publishers piece "When Employees Choose, They Lose"
(1995).
2. The asset amounts exclude funds held by life insurance companies under
allocated group insurance contracts. These funds make up roughly 10 to 15 per-
cent of total private pensions plan assets.
3. Of course there are other motivations for choosing a defined benefit or
defined contribution plan than assumption or diversification ofinvestrnent risk.
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These include the ability to atu-act, retain, and motivate workers during their
working years and to retire them on an orderly basis at the end of their useful
careers. These considerations are not dealt with in the current context.
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